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Abstract
The conflict between fundamental rights of creditors and debtors is one of the contemporary 
problems faced in Civil Procedure and it should be approached from a constitutional 
perspective. Based on the premise that the dignity of the debtor is not absolute, but relative, 
this paper proposes the relativization of some hypotheses of impossibility to levy established 
by law, so as to also preserve the dignity of the creditor. This value judgment should stem from 
the principle of proportionality.
Keywords: Fundamental rights. Civil execution. Proportionality.
Resumo
A colisão entre direitos fundamentais do credor e devedor é um dos problemas 
contemporâneos enfrentados no âmbito da execução civil, cujo enfrentamento deve partir 
de uma perspectiva constitucional. Partindo-se da premissa de que a dignidade da pessoa 
do devedor não é absoluta, mas relativa, o presente artigo propõe a relativização de algumas 
hipóteses de impenhorabilidade previstas na legislação, de modo a também preservar a 
dignidade da pessoa do credor. Este juízo de ponderação entre direitos fundamentais do 
credor e do devedor deve ser realizado a partir do princípio da proporcionalidade.
Palavras-chave: Direitos fundamentais. Execução civil. Proporcionalidade.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the tension surrounding conflicts between fundamental rights 
of creditors and debtors within the scope of Civil Procedure, especially regarding some 
hypotheses of impossibility to levy established in the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code 
2.015 (NCPC)1 and Law 8.009/90, which regulate impossibility to levy family assets.
The main analytical object of this study is the limitation imposed on the 
levy of earned income that is equal to or greater than 50 (fifty) times the monthly 
minimum wage and the (im)possibility to levy high-value family assets, based in 
the fundamental right of the creditor to timely and effective judicial protection, as a 
corollary of human dignity.
The approach springs from a constitutional perspective, based on studies on the 
conflict between fundamental rights, leading to a proposed application of the principle 
of proportionality to solve the dilemma.
The issue is also analyzed within the scope of comparative law, in two parts: first, 
the conflict between the fundamental rights of creditors and debtors is analyzed within 
the scope of civil procedure; second, specific hypotheses of impossibility to levy that 
could implicate a restriction of the fundamental rights of creditors are examined. Finally, 
a proposal based on the principle of proportionality is offered to deal with this issue.
2 The conflict between the fundamental rights of 
creditors and debtors in the scope of civil procedure 
based on the principle of human dignity
In contemporary society, situations involving a conflict between fundamental 
rights are becoming increasingly frequent. In Brazil, this often is the case due to the 
widening of the scope and the intensity given to the protection of fundamental rights 
established in the Federal Constitution of 1988. Although many conflicting situations 
are regulated by subconstitutional legislation, there are cases that lack regulation and 
in these cases, there is a need to solve the conflict arising from the simultaneous and 
contradictory constitutional protection of values or assets.
In the scope of civil procedure, tension lies within the conflict between 
fundamental rights of debtors and creditors, which are diametrically opposed. On 
the one end, there is the fundamental right of the creditor to judicial protection that 
is timely and effective, so as to provide results and, thus, protect the dignity of the 
creditor. On the other end, this protection of rights cannot entail the sacrifice of the 
debtor’s fundamental rights, which would damage his or her dignity.
1  Article 833 of the NCPC (Law 13.105/15).
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Limits to levy are the most important expression of the protection of fundamental 
rights of debtors in the scope of civil procedure. This issue has also received attention 
from legislators in order to curb compensation for creditors, thus assuring the 
preservation of minimum fundamental rights of debtors. This concern has not always 
present throughout the history of Law, especially in terms of procedure. In Roman law, 
procedure was extremely violent, allowing corporal punishment and even death of the 
defendant2. Later, Roman law underwent a timid humanization, limiting the action of 
the plaintiff especially in terms of death and division of the body of the defendant3.
In the classical period, there were some cases of limitation to the seizure of 
assets, with the value seized being proportional to the value of the debt, which is 
similar to the current system used in Brazilian law for liability of the debtor in cases 
of forced execution. During that period of Roman law, there was a greater concern by 
legislators to preserve the minimal conditions of survival of the defendant. Cândido 
Rangel DINAMARCO4 explains that “personal assets necessary to survival, dowry, 
assets belonging to offspring, and assets belonging to others” were excluded from 
financial liability. Although quite incipient, there was a clear move toward the system 
of impossibility to levy that is currently established. That is, there was an evolution in 
Roman law toward a humanization of execution5.
It is not an overstatement to say that impossibility to levy of assets is the last 
measure toward humanization of execution, such as to preserve the dignity of the 
debtor. This measure is guided by the principle of preservation of the defendant to 
2  The Law of XII Tables established that under certain circumstances it would be possible to divide 
the body of the debtor into as many pieces as there were creditors or sell the debtor to a foreigner, 
beyond the Tiber River, which would mean death or a life of extreme misery, as beyond the Tiber lived 
Phoenicians who were mortal enemies of the Romans.
3  In this sense: DINAMARCO, Cândido Rangel. Execução civil. 6a. ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 1998, 
p. 33: “Bodily execution was transformed into seizure of assests, which evolved at a later stage from 
seizure of the entirety of the debtor’s assets to being restricted to only that necessary to compensate the 
violated right”.
4  In: Execução civil. 6ª. ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 1998, p. 46.
5  In this sense, Paulo Henrique dos Santos LUCON (Embargos à execução. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1996, 
p. 28-29): “a gradual humanization of seizure is witnessed from the period of legis actiones, through 
the formulary system, up to cognitio extra ordinem, with increasingly greater chances that the debtor 
would participate in a contradictory procedure. From violent personal execution, the law moves on to the 
seizure of the assets of the debtor. This move is possible insomuch as similar organizations to those that 
will become the Modern State are consolidated, which provides the power to satisfy the right to exercise 
jurisdiction over people who can be said to be invested with that power. The evolution is even more 
important when, at a later moment, through bonorum distractio, the seizure applies only to those assets 
sufficient to pay the debt. Gradually, there becomes a healthy and just proportionality between the owed 
obligation and the acts enforced to fulfill that obligation”.
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ensure the minimal conditions for a dignified survival6. However, the specific limits7 
on impossibility to levy are treated differently, depending on the historical, economic, 
political and cultural aspects of each country8.
Currently, the ability to levy a determined financial amount raises questions 
about the degree to which Brazilian legislators have inflated the protection of debtors 
in evident and unjust detriment to creditors, who also possess fundamental rights. 
Evidently, we do not defend the levy of assets that would truly impair the dignity 
of the debtor, but we do question whether there is not a current exaggeration in the 
humanization of levy, where it is has been forgotten that the creditor also holds the right 
to timely and effective judicial protection, assuring protection of his or her dignity.
In addressing human dignity and the possibility of conflicts that may occur in the 
protection of the dignity of different individuals, Ingo Wolfgang SARLET9 questions 
to what point dignity – in the condition of fundamental right and principle – can 
be considered absolute, impervious to any sort of restriction and/or relativization. 
According to SARLET10,
On the other hand, it can easily be seen that the problem arises 
when the referred to intersubjective dimension of human dignity 
is taken seriously. As all people are equal in dignity (even if they 
do not behave equally dignified) and there is thus an obligation of 
reciprocal respect (of each person) to others’ dignity (in addition 
to the obligation of respect and protection of public authorities 
and society), we can imagine the hypothesis of a direct conflict 
between the dignities of different people, establishing- also in these 
cases – a practical agreement (or harmonization), that necessarily 
entails hierarchization (as Juarez Freitas argues) or the balancing 
6  As is the case in Brazilian law, the concern with unleviability of assets is prevalent in other countries. 
In Portuguese law, there is a list of assets that are absolutely unleviable in article 736 of the new Civil 
Procedure Code. In French law, there are a number of measures in the complex legislation - articles 
13 to 15 and 41 and 42 of Law 91-650, of 1991, which establish levy procedures. In the Italian law, 
provisions for unleviable assets are found in articles 513 and 514.
7  Addressing this issue within the scope of Portuguese law, Rui PINTO affirms that (In: Manual da 
Execução e Despejo. Coimbra: Coimbra editora, 2013, p. 503): “it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that these limits really speak to constitutional principles of human dignity that are dogmatically 
richer and more current (cf. art. 1° CRP) and of the proportionality of the restrictions to the fundamental 
rights of the defendant (cf. art. 18, n. 2, CRP): assets whose levy and/or alienation would offend the 
dignity of the defendant or be in disproportion in relation to the economic gain of the plaintiff are 
absolutely unleviable”.
8  In this sense: LLOBREGAT, José Garberi. El processo de ejecución forzosa en la Nueva Ley de 
Enjuiciamento Civil. Madrid: Civitas, 2003, p. 439.
9  In: Dignidade da pessoa humana e Direitos fundamentais. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2002, p. 124.
10  In: Dignidade da pessoa humana e Direitos fundamentais. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2002, p. 124.
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(as Alexy prefers) of the assets in conflict, in this case, of the asset 
(dignity) concretely attributed to two or more owners. In this same 
line – although with quite particular implications – is situated the 
hypothesis of an agreement in which personal dignity could yield 
in the face of more relevant social values, namely when the aim is 
to protect the life and personal dignity of the other members of a 
certain community.
We understand that the establishment of restrictions on levy11 is already 
characterized as a balanced judgment of the involved interests, opting for the 
mitigation of the plaintiffs’ rights in order to protect the defendant. Nevertheless, 
hypotheses of impossibility to levy may not be based on particular concrete cases, 
which may lead to a disproportion between the restriction of one fundamental right 
and the protection of another.
It is up to the Judicial Power to control the application of rules of levy. In cases 
where there is a disproportional application, it must correct this disproportion, 
preserving the fundamental right of the creditor to timely and effective protection and, 
consequently, the preservation of his or dignity. The widely supported solution entails 
the respect of constitutional protection of the different rights found in the framework 
of the constitution, seeking harmonization of precepts that lead to differing, often 
contradictory, results12. Addressing this issue, Ingo Wolfgang SARLET espouses13:
In this sense, we cannot forget, in agreement with Alexy, that even 
the principle of human dignity (by dint of its very principiological 
condition) becomes subjected to a necessary relativatization, in 
contrast to the equal dignity of third parties, and, nevertheless, 
in the scope of an axiological hierachization, its prevalence in 
conflict to other principles and constitutional rules, even in 
terms of fundamental rights must be conceded. In effect, we must 
recognize, in line with Kloepfer, that even while holding dignity 
as the supreme value of judicial order, the postulate of its absolute 
intangibility does not follow, in and of itself and necessarily. 
Thus, faced with the need to solve the concrete case of tensions in 
relationships between people who are equally dignified, we cannot 
dismiss a balanced judgment (which seems the most correct) or a 
hierarchization, which, clearly can never result in the sacrifice of 
dignity, and this an effectively absolute dimension of dignity, in 
11  Articles 833 and 834 of the NCPC and Law 8.009/90.
12  In this sense, Ingo Wolfgang SARLET. In: A eficácia dos direitos fundamentais – Uma teoria dos 
direitos fundamentais na perspectiva constitucional. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2012, p. 401.
13  In: Dignidade da pessoa humana e Direitos fundamentais. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 
2002, p. 131-2.
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the condition of intrinsic and non-negotiable value of each human 
being, and as such, must always be recognized and protected, thus 
being, and specifically in this sense, imponderable.
The lessons of Portuguese legal scholar José Carlos Vieira de ANDRADE14, 
apply aptly to this problem. According to him, there will be conflict anytime the 
constitution simultaneously protects two values or assets in concrete contradiction. 
The problem is how to solve the conflict between the assets, when both are effectively 
protected as fundamental rights. The solution cannot be solved by resorting to the idea 
of a hierarchical order of constitutional values. It is not always (or perhaps it is never) 
possible to establish a hierarchy between assets to sacrifice less important ones15.
On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that, in cases of conflict, the 
constitution protects the different values or assets at stake and it is illicit to simply 
sacrifice one of them in benefit of the other. According to ANDRADE16, to settle the 
conflict “we also cannot resort to a theory of fundamental rights”. According to him17,
Sometimes, these theories predominantly accentuate a certain 
aspect (liberty, democracy, socialness) and will tend to settle 
the conflict in favor of the right that fits the preferred category. 
However, the order of constitutional values is not hierarchical and, 
thus, does not allow abstract solutions based on the claims which 
the different fundamental rights promote.
Therefore, a solution for the conflict should respect the constitutional protection 
of different rights or values, preserving the integrity of the Constitution, harmonizing 
as best as possible the divergent precepts. Solution of the conflict cannot affect the 
essential core of any fundamental right protecting values or assets that are different.
However, this principle of practical agreement as a criterion to settle conflicts 
should not be accepted or understood as an automatic regulator. Rather, it should be 
put into effect through a criterion of proportionality in the distribution of the costs of 
conflict. On the one hand, it is necessary that the sacrifice of each of the constitutional 
values allows for the safeguarding of the others (otherwise, it is not a true conflict)18. In 
this sense, Ingo Wolfgang SARLET19 claims:
14  In: Os direitos fundamentais na Constituição Portuguesa de 1976. Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1987, p. 220.
15  In: ANDRADE, José Carlos Vieira de. Os direitos fundamentais na Constituição Portuguesa de 1976, p. 221.
16  In: Os direitos fundamentais na Constituição Portuguesa de 1976. Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 1987, p. 221.
17  In: Os direitos fundamentais na Constituição Portuguesa de 1976. Coimbra: Livraria Almedina, 
1987, p. 221-2.
18  In: ANDRADE, José Carlos Vieira de. Os direitos fundamentais na Constituição Portuguesa de 1976, p. 223.
19  In: Dignidade da pessoa humana e Direitos fundamentais. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2002, p. 118.
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In all of the cases… it is necessary to perform a balancing (and, 
above all, a hierarchization) of all the assets at stake, in order 
to efficiently protect human dignity, applying the principle of 
proportionality, which, in turn, is equally connected in this 
perspective to the principle of dignity.
On the other hand, a strict application of the idea of proportionality requires 
the choice among a number of ways to settle the concrete conflict in terms of causing 
the least amount of loss to each of the values at stake, according to their weight in the 
situation (in terms of intensity and extension with which the constitutionally conceded 
protection of these values will be affected)20.
The issue of conflicts of rights or values depends, therefore, on an evaluation of 
weight, where we must seek and justify the solution that is most in line with the set 
of constitutional values, in the face of specific situations or forms of exercising rights. 
In this sense, some categorical affirmations have been made to the effect that only 
principles can be objects of balancing21. Humberto ÁVILA22, to the contrary, argues 
that there can also be balancing among rules23:
It has become commonplace to hear categorical affirmations 
regarding the distinction between principles and rules. Norms 
20  In: ANDRADE, José Carlos Vieira de. Os direitos fundamentais an Constituição Portuguesa de 1976, 
p. 223. The same author also argues that “sometimes it is not possible to graduate the concrete solutions 
in terms that correspond point by point to the graduations of asset protection, and thus there seems to be 
a total sacrifice of one of them. For example, in the conflict between right to property and to freedom of 
expression, if it were considered illicit to paint private walls against the will of the owner. However, this 
solution would not mean the complete irrelevance of freedom of expression in these situations: even if 
that meant the right to indemnization of the owner, the penal sanction of this activity (crime of damage) 
should always be considered excluded, by force of freedom of expression”.
21  Robert ALEXY defines rules as norms whose premises are directly fulfilled, or not, and cannot nor 
should be balanced. For him, rules institute definitive obligations, which are not surpassed by contrary 
norms, while principles institute obligations, prima facie, in that they can be surpassed or defeated by 
other colliding principles. (In: Teoria dos Direitos Fundamentais. Tradução Virgílio Afonso da Silva. 
São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2a. ed, 2011, p. 92).
22  In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos. 16a. ed., rev. e atual. São 
Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 46.
23  According to Humberto ÁVILA (In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios 
jurídicos. 16a. ed., rev. e atual. São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 73), “in the case of colliding 
principles, the solution cannot be solved by the immediate determination of prevalence of one principle 
over the other, but is established through balancing between the colliding principles, depending on which 
of them, in specific concrete circumstances, receives prevalence. This tension and the way it is settled 
is what distinguishes principles from rules: while in the conflict between rules, it is necessary to verify 
whether the rule is inside or outside of a certain judicial order, in the conflict between principles, the 
conflict is already within the same order”.
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are either principles or rules. Rules do not need nor can be objects 
of balancing; principles need to and must be balanced. Rules 
institute definitive duties, regardless of the factual and normative 
possibilities; principles institute preliminary duties, which depend 
on the factual and normative possibilities. When two rules clash, 
one of the two is invalidated, or an exception should be made for 
one of them in order to settle the conflict. When two principles 
clash, both surpass the conflict, maintaining their validity, and the 
person who applies the principle must decide which has the greatest 
weight. In effect, as for the doctrine, in general, it is understood 
that there is an interpretation of rules and a balancing of principles 
and this study critiques this separation, aiming to demonstrate the 
capacity to also balance rules.
ÁVILA’s position is important to this study, precisely because it is necessary to 
perform a balancing among the different rules that constitute limitations to levy, in 
order to provide timely and effective judicial protection to the fundamental right of the 
creditor. Addressing this issue, Marcelo Lima GUERRA24 espouses:
The first finding that arises in the interpretation is that unleviability 
of assets of the debtor imposed by law consists of a restriction of 
the fundamental right of the creditor to judicial action. [...] the 
restrictions on fundamental rights are not, in principle, illegitimate. 
However, they should be geared toward protecting other 
fundamental rights and may, for that reason, be subject to a judicial 
revision to verify, in the concrete case, whether the limitation, 
although motivated by another fundamental right, brings about a 
full comprehension of the restricted fundamental right.
Based on the premises laid out above, the next section deals with the applicability 
of the principle of proportionality in the scope of civil procedure, aiming toward 
preservation of the fundamental rights of both creditor and debtor.
24  In: Direitos Fundamentais e a Proteção do Credor na Execução Civil. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos 
Tribunais, 2003, p. 165.
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2.1 The principle of proportionality25 as a form of ensuring the fulfillment of 
fundamental rights of the creditor and debtor in the scope of civil procedure
The principle of proportionality arises in the XVIII Century, stemming from the 
idea of limitation of power. It is considered a measure with supra positive value to the 
Rule of Law and aims to ensure the domain of individual freedom from administrative 
interference. At that time, the criterion of proportionality included the administrative 
and penal areas26. In this sense, it is at the root of Enlightenment thought, being 
25  The framework of proportionality as a principle is criticized by the doctrine. Addressing the issue, 
Virgílio Afonso da SILVA (In: Direitos Fundamentais – conteúdo essencial, restrições e eficácia. 2a. ed. 
São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2010, p. 168) affirms: “[…] the concept of principle adopted here is not 
related to the importance of the norm to which such a denomination applies. Principle, in the terms of 
this study, is a norm that requires that something be carried out as much as possible under the factual 
and judicial conditions of the concrete case. Proportionality, […], does not follow that rationale. On the 
contrary, it has the structure of a rule, because it imposes a definitive duty: in the case of its application, 
it is not subject to the factual and judicial conditions of the concrete case. Its application is therefore 
carried out as a whole. Without being able to denominate it ‘principle of proportionality’ – at least in 
the framework of this study- we are left with a few alternatives proposed by the doctrine. The first is 
the denomination ‘maxim of proportionality’, which probably is a direct translation of the German 
term. The problem with this denomination is that in the Brazilian judicial language, ‘maxim’ is rarely 
used and could be interpreted not as an obligation, as is the case in the application of proportionality, 
but as a mere recommendation. Finally, Humberto Ávila suggests that proportionality be considered 
what he calls an applied normative postulate. A normative postulate, according to Ávila, is a norm 
that establishes the structure of application for other norms, in other words, a metanorm. Although 
proportionality is not actually a rule of conduct, but a rule concerning the application of other rules, 
it does not seem that resorting to the idea of ‘an applied normative postulate’ has any purpose. Ávila 
warns that calling proportionality a rule – as I proposed in another study – would complicate more 
than it would clarify. One indication of this is that even adepts of the theory of principles, in the line 
proposed by Alexy, recognize that proportionality is a special type of rule, and not a common rule. […] 
I do not believe it is a case of demonstrating whether there is a right or a wrong in this issue. For those 
who think not calling a rule a rule only because it is not a rule of conduct or of competency will facilitate 
comprehension, resorting to other denominations such as ‘applied normative postulate’ may be a way 
out. But only as long as it is kept in mind, that these postulates also have the structure of a rule. In the 
present study, however, because I do not believe the denomination ‘applied normative postulate’ adds 
conceptual clarity, I prefer to call the rule of proportionality a ‘rule’, also keeping in mind that it is a 
special rule, or a rule on a second level, or, a ‘meta-rule’.”.
26  According to Santiago GUERRA FILHO (In: A Filosofia do Direito – Aplicada ao Direito Processual 
e à Teoria da Constituição, p. 81), “it is natural to try to find the source of thinking enclosed within 
the principle of proportionality in the poetic cradle of our civilization, ancient Greece, where the idea 
that Law is something that should encompass utility (synpheron) for members of a community, for 
whose well-being it is the last resort. Roman jurists also commonly justified Law by its utility and 
ULPIANO defined Ius privatum as ‘ius quod ad singularum utilitatem spectar’ (D 1, 1, § 2°). At that 
time, administrative interventions or laws on private property were commonly based on the topos of 
utilitas publica’. WIEACKER, in his brilliant History of Private Law in Europe, records the evolution 
of this form of instrumental and utilitarian thinking up to its absolute prevalence in the last 100 years. 
Significant indications provide the utilitarianism of BENTHAM, without a doubt the most influential 
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mentioned by MONTESQUIEU and BECCARIA (both of whom addressed 
proportionality of punishment in relation to the crimes)27.
In the XIX Century, the idea of proportionality becomes a general principle 
of the right of police, within administrative law, manifesting itself in the need for a 
legal limitation of the arbitrariness of the executive power28. According to Dimitri 
DIMOULIS and Leonardo MARTINS29,
The idea of proportionality is rooted in contemporary constitutional 
judicial thought. Developed originally, in judicial-dogmatic molds 
that are relevant here, by the jurisprudence of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in the decade of 1959, it was readily accepted 
by the German doctrine. In recent decades, it has been exported 
to many parts of the world, including Southern Europe, which 
determined to a large degree, but not exclusively, the way it was 
received in Brazil and other countries in Latin America. It also has 
been applied in the jurisprudence of international courts.
However, this principle was only elevated to a constitutional status in the XX 
Century, in Germany30.
doctrine in Anglo-Saxon law, and teleological thinking of the late phase in JHERING [...] which has its 
origin in the so-called ‘ jurisprudence of interests’, whose later development results in the ‘ jurisprudence 
of values’, advocate of the currently predominant methodological paradigm in German legal science, 
which can really be considered the most advanced in the ‘Family’ of Civil Law. Leaving the specifically 
judicial terrain to enter the adjacent area of morality, the ancient Greek held the rhetorical idea of 
behavior as that of proportionality, of harmonious equilibrium, expressed by the notions of metronym, 
the standard of just, beautiful and good, of hybris, the extravagance of this measure, the source of 
suffering. In the Aristotelian thinking, these notions were formalized in the Hellenic sense that in the 
idea of ‘distributive justice’, which imposes the division of obligations and rewards as arising from 
one’s position in the community, or status, as well as for services (or disservices) provided. Through 
stoicism, this Greek idea is introduced into the Roman judicial mentality, receiving the famous formula 
as ‘ius suum cuique tribuere’, from ULPIANO (D.1, 1, 1 § 1°). In ancient Roman law, however, there 
are manifestations of the principle of proportionality of rules employed by the praetor to compute the 
quantity (amount) of interest parcels of debt, obligations, private offense, or indeminization accrued by 
a single offender. The conclusion reached from this brief historical reconstitution, an attempt to focalize 
the idea of proportion in the archetypes of Western judicial thought, is that it is confused, in practice, 
with the very idea of ‘right’, aequum, khanón, regula, symbolically materialized in the equilibrium of 
the scale that Themis holds”.
27  In: PEÑALVA, Ernesto Pedraz. Constitución, jurisdicción y proceso, p. 277.
28  In: CANOTILHO, J. J. Gomes. Direito Constitucional. 5a.. ed. Coimbra: Almedina, 1991, p. 386.
29  In: Teoria Geral dos Direitos Fundamentais. São Paulo: Atlas, 2014, p. 176.
30  According to Willis Santiago GUERRA FILHO, “as, in relation to legal theory, the national 
doctrinators only begin to become aware of the distinction between rules and principles, mentioned 
before, it is also little by little that scholars of constitutional law and other branches of law become aware 
of the need, intrinsic to the good functioning of a Democratic Rule of Law, to recognize and employ the 
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According to Willis Santiago GUERRA FILHO31,
[...] the principle of proportionality, understood as the mandate of 
optimization of maximal respect for every fundamental right, in 
a situation of conflict with another (others), insofar as is factually 
and judicially possible, can be divided into three “partial principles” 
(Teilgrundsätze): “principle of proportionality in the strict 
sense” or “maxim of balancing” (Abwägungsgebot), “principle of 
appropriateness” and “principle of demandability” or “maxim of the 
softest means” (Gebot des mildesten Mittels)32.
It is not an overstatement to claim that the principle of proportionality is of 
fundamental importance in the settling of conflicts, providing a set of criteria that 
allow the judicial professional to solve the conflict between fundamental rights, 
through a balancing of the circumstances involved in the concrete case. However, it 
can be seen that this principle – in the breadth that it takes on when considering its 
separate elements – does not represent a substantive, material criterion of the decision, 
but serves only to establish a procedural directive, a process of the material search for 
a decision, with justice clearly applied to the concrete specific case33. This procedural 
character of the principle of proportionality is demonstrated in the relation of 
subsidiarity, which can be seen in its separate elements34.
The principle of proportionality, in the broad sense, is broken down into three 
elements: the principle of proportionality in the strict sense, the principle of conformity 
or appropriateness of means and the principle of necessity. Although there is not an 
principle of proportionality,the Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, also called ‘mandate of prohibition 
of excess’ (Übermaßverbot)”. Processo constitucional e direitos fundamentais, p. 61. About the subject, 
MORAIS, Fausto Santos de. Ponderação e Arbitrariedade: A inadequada recepção de Alexy pelo STF. 
Salvador: Editora JusPODIVM, 2016. p. 92-101.
31  In: GUERRA FILHO, Willis Santiago. Processo constitucional e direitos fundamentais, p. 67.
32  “The constitutional foundation of the principle of proportionality in a broad sense (Übermassverbot) is 
derived from the Rule of Law for some authors, while others claim it arises in the sphere of fundamental 
rights, or even, that it may arise from the principle of legal due process”. STUMM, Raquel Denize. 
Princípio da proporcionalidade no Direito Constitucional brasileiro, p. 78.
33  In this sense: MORAIS, Fausto Santos de MORAIS. Ponderação e Arbitrariedade: A inadequada 
recepção de Alexy pelo STF. Salvador: Revista Jus PODIVM, p. 119.
34  According to Marcelo Lima GUERRA (In: Direitos Fundamentais e a Proteção do Credor na Execução 
Civil. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2003, p. 93), this same procedural character is what confers 
such a fundamentally important role to the rule of proportionality, simultaneously in the two distinct 
contexts surrounding any decision: the context of the discovery of the decision and the context of 
its justification. Indeed, the rule of proportionality is not only instrumental in the elaboration (or 
‘discovery’) of a decision about fundamental rights, but is mainly instrumental in its justification. The 
separate elements that make up the rule of proportionality act as very ‘tests’ of the correction (or better 
yet, of the constitutionality) of the decision, thus constituting justifying criteria. 
76
Revista Brasileira de Direito, Passo Fundo, vol. 14, n. 2, p. 64-94, Maio-Agosto, 2018 - ISSN 2238-0604
express rule in Brazilian law35 for this principle36, the Brazilian doctrine37 reproduces 
and endorses this triple characterization of the principle of proportionality38. 
Addressing the three elements of proportionality, Humberto ÁVILA explains39:
This apparent clarity regarding the circumstances of the postulate 
of proportionality requires an exam of appropriateness, of necessity 
and of proportionality in the strict sense. The means must be 
appropriate to reach the ends. But, what does appropriateness 
consist of, exactly? The means chosen should be necessary among 
those available. But, what does necessary mean? The advantages of 
using the mean should outweigh the disadvantages. But, in what 
sense of advantage does this mean and relative to what and to 
whom should they be analyzed? All things considered, the three 
exams involved in the application of proportionality are only 
apparently uncontroversial. Their investigation reveals problems 
that need to be clarified, at the risk of proportionality, which was 
conceived to combat the practice of arbitrary acts, ending up as 
subterfuge in the very practice of these acts.
Thus, proportionality depends on the interweaving between legal assets and 
an intersubjectively controllable relation between means and ends. If there is not 
a properly structured means-end relation, the exam of proportionality will be 
35  In this sense: MORAIS, Fausto Santos de. Ponderação e Arbitrariedade: A inadequada recepção de 
Alexy pelo STF. Salvador: Editora JusPODIVM, 2016, p. 113-123.
36  According to WIillis Santiago GUERRA FILHO (in: Processo constitucional e direitos fundamentais, 
p. 63), the fact that the principle of proportionality “is not expressly established in the Constitution of 
our country does not impede that we recognize it in vigor here as well, invoking that established in § 
2.º article 5.º: The rights and guarantees expressed in this Constitution do not exclude others arising from 
the regime and the principles it adopts”.
37 In this sense: BONAVIDES, Paulo. Curso de Direito Constitucional, p. 318-9. Na doutrina lusitana: 
CANOTILHO, J. J. Gomes. Direito Constitucional, p. 386-388.
38  “Also in the domain of the Judicial Power, the principle has been applied, notably in the treatment of 
precautionary measures. [...] Indeed, the measurement of reasonableness counts for a judgment of merit 
about the acts edited by the Legislative Power, which interferes with the delineation most commonly 
accepted of the discretion of the legislator. Upon examining the compatibility between means and ends 
and the nuances of necessity-proportionality of the adopted measure, the action of the Judicial Power 
transcends that of mere objective control of legality. And conventional knowledge, as is known, rejects the 
idea of a judge substituting an administrator or legislator to impose his or her own judgment of a given 
matter. The truth, however, is that, upon assessing a law to verify whether it is arbitrary or not, the judge 
or court is inevitably rejecting its own point of view that it be rational or reasonable.” In: BARROSO, 
Luis Roberto. Os Princípios da Razoabilidade e da Proporcionalidade no Direito Constitucional, p. 73.
39  In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São 
Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 205.
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meaningless, falling into a void40.
2.1.1 Principle of conformity or appropriateness of means
The previous discussion applies as well to the idea that public interest must be 
ensured through measures that are appropriate to the subjacent ends being striven 
for. This requires utilization of means whose efficacy will contribute to the gradual 
obtainment of the end.
The control of acts of public power (legislative and executive), which should 
address the relation of mean-end appropriateness, presupposes an investigation and 
proof of its aptitude and conformity to the ends that spurred its adoption41.
The question arises: what does it mean for a mean to be appropriate to the 
achievement of an end? From what perspective should the relation of appropriateness 
be analyzed? What sort of control over decisions adopted by the Public Power should 
be instituted? According to Humberto ÁVILA42, the answer to the first question passes 
through the analysis of the relation between the different means available and the 
desired end, which involves three aspects: quantitative (intensity), qualitative (quality) 
and probabilistic (certainty). Addressing this subject, he argues43:
In quantitative terms, one mean may promote an end less, equally 
or more than another mean. In qualitative terms, one mean 
may promote an end worse, equally or better than another. In 
probabilistic terms, one mean may promote an end with less, equal 
or more certainty than another. This means that the comparison 
between means will not always lead to a choice that maintains a 
constant level (quantitatively, qualitatively or probabilistically), as 
40  In this sense, Humberto ÁVILA (In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios 
jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 206-207): “without a means-
end relation, an exam of the postulate of proportionality cannot be performed, because the elements 
that structure it are missing. In this sense, it is important to investigate the meaning of end: an end is 
a concrete desired result (extra-judicially); a result that can be perceived even in the absence of legal 
norms and concepts, as for example to obtain or increase or extinguish assets, reach certain states or 
fulfill certain conditions, give cause to or impede an action. … End means the desired state of things. 
Principles establish, precisely, the obligation to promote ends. To structure the application of postulate 
of proportionality, the progressive determination of the end is fundamental. A vague and indeterminate 
end scarcely enables one to verify whether it is gradually promoted by the adoption of a mean or not. 
Moreover, depending on the determination of the end, the exams themselves will be modified; one 
measure may be appropriate, or not, depending on the very determinability of the end”.
41  In: CANOTILHO, J. J. Gomes. Direito Constitucional, p. 387.
42  In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São 
Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 209.
43  In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São 
Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 209.
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occurs in the comparison between one weaker and another stronger 
mean, one worse and another better or between one less certain and 
another more certain in the promotion of an end.
[...]
This leads to the next important question: does the administrator 
or legislator have the duty to choose the most intense, the best or 
the most certain mean to an end, or should the choice of mean 
‘simply’ promote the end? The administrator and legislator have the 
obligation to choose a mean that simply promotes the end.
Considering the premises mentioned above, it is necessary to understand what it 
means to adopt an appropriate measure. A measure will generally be appropriate if it 
serves as an instrument to promote the end. Appropriateness should be evaluated at the 
time the mean is chosen and not later, when the choice is evaluated44.
In the scope of civil procedure, a measure will be adequate if it ensures the dignity 
of both the debtor and the creditor.
2.1.2 Principle of necessity
The main idea of this principle is that the freedom of one individual should be 
restricted as little as possible, which involves a verification of alternative means to 
those initially chosen by the legislative or executive power45. This is what is understood, 
for example, by the German Federal Constitutional Court, which formulated the 
maxim that the end cannot be reached by another mean that affects the individual 
less, removing its character as a principle of the norms of fundamental rights46. The 
option selected by the legislative or executive power must be shown to be the best 
and only viable possibility to obtain certain ends with the least cost to the individual: 
44  Addressing appropriateness, Virgílio Afonso da SILVA (In: Direitos Fundamentais – conteúdo 
essencial, restrições e eficácia. 2a. ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2010, p. 169-170), explains: “when a 
government measure entails intervention in the scope of fundamental right protection, this measure 
must necessarily strive toward an end that is constitutionally legitimate, which, in general, is to ensure 
another fundamental right. Applying a rule of proportionality, in these cases, means beginning with 
the question: is the measure adopted appropriate to promote the achievement of the desired end? Some 
authors defend a more demanding line of questioning, in terms of an analysis, not of whether the mean 
is appropriate only to promote, but to completely fulfill the desired end. The requirement of complete 
fulfillment of the desired end is counterproductive, since it is difficult to know for sure, beforehand, if 
a measure will indeed achieve the objective it aims for. Often, the legislator has to make predictions 
without knowing whether they will be fulfilled or whose outcome is beyond the limits of knowing. In these 
cases, any demand for total fulfillment would be possible to fulfill. Thus, the first alternative is preferable 
and is also the alternative supported by the majority of the doctrine”.
45 Neste sentido, Humberto ÁVILA (In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios 
jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 214).
46  In: ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales, p. 114.
79
Revista Brasileira de Direito, Passo Fundo, vol. 14, n. 2, p. 64-94, Maio-Agosto, 2018 - ISSN 2238-0604
observation of the cost-benefit relation in every political-legal decision, in order to 
preserve, insofar as possible, citizens’ rights47. In this sense, according to Humberto 
ÁVILA48, the exam of necessity involves two steps:
[...] first, the exam of the equality of appropriateness of means, 
to verify whether the alternative means promote the end equally; 
second, the exam of the less restrictive mean, to examine whether 
the alternative means restrict to a lesser degree collaterally affected 
fundamental rights.
Thus, verifying the least restrictive mean should indicate the most temperate 
mean. In the hypothesis of general norms, the necessary mean is that which is mildest 
or least grave with regard to collateral fundamental rights, for the average case. Even 
in general acts, it is possible, except in exceptional cases, and based on the postulate 
of reasonableness, to override the general rule in order to observe the obligation to 
minimally consider the personal conditions of the affected people49.
Addressing the principles of necessity and appropriateness, Willis Santiago 
GUERRA FILHO50 explains that they “establish, within that which is factually possible, 
that the chosen mean will serve to reach the established end, proving to be ‘appropriate’. 
In addition, this mean should be shown to be ‘demandable, which means that there is no 
other equally efficient and less damaging to fundamental rights”.
In the scope of civil procedure, it may be necessary to flexibilize the hypotheses 
of impossibility to levy established in the legislation, in order to preserve the dignity of 
the creditor, an argument that will be elaborated in the second part of this paper.
47  In: STUMM, Raquel Denize. Princípio da proporcionalidade no Direito Constitucional brasileiro, p. 79-80.
48  In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São 
Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 214.
49  In this sense, Humberto ÁVILA (In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios 
jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 216).
50  In: Processo constitucional e direitos fundamentais, p. 68. On this subject, Willis Santiago GUERRA 
FILHO, p. 68, cites the understanding of the German Constitutional Court: “The mean employed 
by the legislator should be appropriate and demandable, in order to reach the desired end. It is the 
appropriate mean, when its aid promotes the desired result; it is demandable when the legislator could 
not have chosen another equally efficient mean that would do less harm or present a limitation less 
perceptible to the fundamental right (BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, 1971, p. 316)”. “In the decision 
of the German Court, the presence of another qualifying requisite of reasonableness-proportionality 
can be seen, which is that of demandability or necessity (Erforderlichkeit) of the measure. Also known 
as the ‘principle of the least interference possible’, consisting of the imperative that the means utilized 
to reach the desired ends be the least onerous to the citizen. It is the so-called prohibition of excess. 
A law will be unconstitutional, due to infringement of the principle of proportionality, ‘if it can be 
verified, unequivocally, the existence of other less harmful measure’”. In the same sense: BARROSO, 
Luis Roberto. “Os Princípios da Razoabilidade e da Proporcionalidade no Direito Constitucional”. 
Cadernos de Direito Constitucional e Ciência Política, São Paulo, v. 23, p. 72.
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2.1.3 Principle of proportionality in the strict sense
The principle of proportionality in the strict sense establishes a correspondence 
between the end to be achieved by a normative provision and the mean employed, 
which should be the best legally possible mean. In other words, above all, the essential 
core of fundamental rights cannot be damaged51, with intolerable disrespect toward 
human dignity52. According to Humberto ÁVILA53, “the exam of proportionality in the 
strict sense requires the comparison between the importance of achieving the end and the 
intensity of the restriction of fundamental rights”.
This principle is confused with the pragmatics of balancing or the law or 
balancing. This stems from an analysis of the space of semantic discretion present 
in the legal system. It consists of a requirement for balancing of results to the 
appropriateness between means and ends. The issue that must be evaluated is how and 
to what degree balancing can be justified in law. In a balancing, “the task of the legal 
scholar is precisely the ‘materialization’ of values. It is up to them, for that reason, to 
carry out a valuation with the help of ‘value-oriented thinking’ [...].”54
The nature of directives of valid principles provides an optimization of the legal 
and factual possibilities for a given situation. Optimizing means a relativization of 
the judicial possibilities of a given principle, considering the weight of the colliding 
principle in a concrete case. The decision regarding a conflict requires a balancing55 
51 “[...] el BverfG ha llevado a cabo una aplicación diferenciada del principio de proporcionalidad en el 
dominio de los derechos fundamentales, en atención a los distintos grados de protección de las garantías 
jurídicas fundamentales (114) (115). Si como se destacó más arriba la defensa debe ser mayor cuando 
afecten a formas elementales del ser y existir del hombre, es comprensible – dice Arndt (116) – la acepción 
del apartado de los Derechos fundamentales como ordenación jerárquica de valores dentro del sistema de los 
acogidos por la Primera Norma (BverfG 7, 198, 215). Destaquemos saimplesmente que para el supremo órgano 
de control constitucional alemán corresponden: al primer grado la protección, la liberdad de la persona; al 
segundo, los derechos a la integridad física y moral, a la inviolabilidad corporal, intimidad personal, secreto 
de las comunicaciones, inviolabilidad del domicilio, a fijar libremente su residencia; al tercero, la protección 
de la propiedad y la liberdad de elección profesional; finalmente, al cuarto grado, la liberdad de ejercicio 
profesional, etc.”, PEÑALVA, Ernesto Pedraz. Constitución, jurisdicción y proceso, p. 300.
52  In: GUERRA FILHO, Willis Santiago. Processo constitucional e direitos fundamentais, p. 68.
53  In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São 
Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 217.
54  In: LARENZ, Karl. Metodologia da ciência do Direito. Traduzido por José Lamego. 5a. ed. Lisboa: 
Fundação Calouste Gulbekian, 1983, p. 350.
55  The law of balancing can be expressed this way: the greater degree of non-satisfaction or of impact 
on a principle, the greater must be the satisfaction of the other (ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los 
derechos fundamentales, p. 161). “prima facie principles always have relative weights and due to the 
need to optimize judicial possibilities, they can only be restricted to the degree that they are not affected 
more than necessary for the application of another principle” (STUMM, Raquel Denize. Princípio da 
proporcionalidade no Direito Constitucional brasileiro, p. 81). The law of balancing entails two stages: 
in the first, what matters is the satisfaction of the opposing principle and, in the second, there is a 
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from the moment that it is verified56.
Balancing of results is a method for legal development and the elaboration of 
the principle of proportionality arises precisely from the rationalization of concrete 
solutions for conflicts of law and assets, as is witnessed in judicial practice57.
In the mandate of balancing, that is, in the principle of proportionality in the 
strict sense, there is a balancing between the judicial possibilities, while in the other 
two maxims of the principle of proportionality (necessity and appropriateness) 
the factual possibilities are considered. Balancing can be fundamental not only in 
principles of fundamental rights, but in principles of Rule of Law or, even, in judicial 
practice or in the concept of justice58.
In this sense, it is essential to ask the following questions: does the degree of 
importance of the promotion of the end justify the degree of restriction caused to 
fundamental rights? Are the advantages gained by promoting the end proportional 
to the disadvantages cause by adopting the mean? Humberto ÁVILA59 explains that 
the answers to these questions reveal the complexity of the problem “the judgment of 
that which is considered to be an advantage and that which is considered a disadvantage 
depends on a strongly subjective evaluation. Normally, a mean is adopted to reach a 
public finality, related to the collective interest (protection of the environment, protection 
of consumers) and its adoption causes restrictions to the fundamental rights of citizens as 
a collateral effect”.
In the scope of civil procedure, as an expression of the principle of proportionality 
in the strict sense, the restrictions to levy cannot be relativized to the point of only 
pertaining to the essential fundamental rights of the debtor.
formulation of a mandate (ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales, p. 162), which is 
expressed through rules. Balancing is not an abstract or general procedure (ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de 
los derechos fundamentales, p. 166), on the contrary, it is the work of optimization to fulfill the principle 
of practical concordance (In: Robert ALEXY. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales, p. 167).
56  In: ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales, p. 112.
57  In: the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, in a case that aimed to institute obligatory weighing of gas 
cylinders in front of consumers, found the measure disproportional (Tribunal Pleno, MC na ADI 
855-2-pr, Rel. Min. Sepúlveda Pertence, j. 01.07.1993). According to Humberto ÁVILA (In: Teoria dos 
Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São Paulo: Malheiros 
Editores, 2015, p. 217), “a reading of the decision shows that the intensity of the restrictions caused to the 
principle of free initiative and private property (excessive onus to companies, who would have to provide 
a scale for each vehicle, elevating the cost, which would be passed on to the price of cylinders, and the 
inconvenience to consumers to have to go out to the vehicles to watch the weighing) would outweigh the 
importance of promoting the end (consumer protection from being deceived in the purchase of cylinders 
that did not contain the amount indicated”.
58  In: ALEXY, Robert. Teoría de los derechos fundamentales, p. 115.
59  In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos. 16a. ed. rev. e atual. São 
Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 217
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3 Preservation of fundamental rights of the debtor 
in civil procedure and the flexibilization of rules 
that contemplate impossibility to levy as a form 
of preserving the dignity of the creditor
The principle of proportionality, in line with the discussion above, is one of the 
alternatives to address the problem involved in the conflict between fundamental rights 
of the debtor and creditor in civil procedure. The greatest points of tension are found 
in the scope of impossibility to levy, which is based on the protection of fundamental 
rights of the debtor.
In this section, we will address two hypotheses of impossibility to levy, whose 
reach is susceptible to critiques, considering the potential restriction posed to the 
fundamental rights of the creditor: the impossibility to levy part of the revenue from 
the product of labor and the impossibility to levy high-value family assets.
3.1 Levy of a portion of revenues earned with the product of labor in 
brazilian law: from the civil procedure code of 1973 to the civil procedure 
code of 2015
The Civil Procedure Code of 1973 contemplated article 649, line IV, impossibility 
to levy revenues earned with the product of labor, except in the case of levy to pay 
alimony. The jurisprudence that was built throughout the period of the 1973 Civil Code 
(CPC), given the dominance of impossibility to levy of these respective incomes60 – 
with the exception expressly made to alimony - evolved in the sense of allowing levy of 
60  In this sense the understanding of the Superior Court of Justice: “CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
REGULATORY COMPLAINT IN THE SPECIAL APPEAL COMPLAINT. LEVY OF SALARY. 
PERCENTUAL OF 30%. IMPOSSIBILITY. DECISION MAINTAINED. 1. This Superior Court adopts 
the position that the character of impossibility to levy pay, wages and salary (among other sums related 
to earnings from labor) is only subject to exception in the case of payment for alimony. 2. Exceptionally, 
the general rule of impossibility to levy, through deduction from a bank account, of pay, wages, salary, 
bonuses, earnings, retirement funds, in line with art. 649, IV, of the CPC, which is incidental in most 
cases, should be subject to an exception in this concrete case, based on the factual conditions provided 
in the original decision and appellate decision (Precedent 7/STJ) (REsp 1285970/SP, Rel. Ministro 
SIDNEI BENETI, Terceira Turma, julgado em 27/5/2014, DJe 8/9/2014) 3. In the present case, the local 
court made no manifestations related to other attempts to collect the owed value. 4. Inapplicability 
of provisions of the NCPC, in that which refers to requisites of admissibility of appeals, the provisions 
are not applicable to the concrete case in the face of the terms of Precedent n. 1 approved by the STJ 
plenary in session 03/09/2016: For appeals grounded in the CPC/1973 (relative to decisions published on 
or before March 17, 2016) requisites of admissibility must be required as established in that Code, with 
interpretations made up until then by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice. 4. Interlocutory 
appeal not granted”. (AgRg no REsp 1497214/DF, Rel. Ministro MOURA RIBEIRO, TERCEIRA 
TURMA, julgado em 26/04/2016, DJe 09/05/2016).
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a portion of the salary in other hypotheses61.
The New Civil Code (Law 13.105/15) establishes in article 833, § 2, the possibility 
of levy of values that are greater than 50 (fifty) times the minimum monthly wage. 
We deem this to be a very small move forward in the new legislation, considering that 
the value corresponding to 50 minimum salaries is a very high value in comparison 
to the average salary of Brazilians (in the year 2016, it corresponded to practically R$ 
40,000.00, whereas the minimum salary was approximately R$ 800.00). This value is 
much greater than the minimum necessary for survival.
Clearly, the norms that restrict patrimonial liability – impeding the levy of 
certain assets, in the case under analysis, earnings from the product of labor – are 
constitutional. The restriction on levy of certain assets is a traditional procedural 
technique and is widely accepted in our society. But these rules can be mitigated, if 
their application is shown to be disproportional and unreasonable62.
Based on the arguments of Humberto ÁVILA and in this concrete case related to 
the limitation, stipulated in the 2015 Civil Code, to the levy of part of earnings from 
the product of labor, except for cases involving debts of alimony, or in cases where the 
value is greater than 50 (fifty) times the minimum monthly wage, we understand that 
it is possible to perform a balancing between the constitutional rules that substantiate 
the preservation of the fundamental rights of the debtor, by limiting levy of earnings, 
with the constitutional principle that ensures the fundamental right to temperate and 
effective judicial protection63 – which is an expression of article 5, lines XXXV and 
61  In that sense, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice: “CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
EXECUTION. LEVY. VALUES FROM EARNINGS FROM THE PRODUCT OF LABOR. 
PRECEDENTS N. 7 AND 83 OF THE STJ. PRO JUDICATO PRECLUSION. PRECEDENT N. 284 OF 
THE STF. 1. The special appeal is inadmissible when grounds are not pertinent to the content of the 
appellate decision. 2. The general rule of impossibility to levy established in art. 649, IV, of the CPC 
can be mitigated, based on principles of effectivity and reasonableness in cases that show that levy 
will not affect the dignity of the debtor. Precedents. 3. It is unknown whether the exam of the supposed 
opposition of the decision to provisions of the law in the appeal is conditioned to the (re)evaluation 
of the factual-probative premise already defined in the scope of the ordinary court. 4. Interlocutory 
appeal not granted.”. (AgRg no REsp 1473848/MS, Rel. Ministro JOÃO OTÁVIO DE NORONHA, 
TERCEIRA TURMA, julgado em 22/09/2015, DJe 25/09/2015).
62 Humberto ÁVILA (In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos. 16a. ed. 
rev. e atual. São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2015, p. 75), addressing the conflict between rules, explains: 
“this is a concrete conflict between rules, such that the judge must attribute a greater weight to one of 
them, based on the finality that each aims to preserve: either the finality of preserving the life of the 
citizen will be preserved, or the finality of guaranteeing intangibility of the destination already provided 
by the Public Power to income”.
63 Roberto Omar BERIZONCE (In: Tutelas procesales diferenciadas. Buenos Aires: Rubinzal – Culzoni, 
2009, p. 111), ao tratar do tema, leciona: “La explosión de la conflictividad colectiva en sectores tan 
diversos como los que se relacionan con la defensa del médio ambiente, el patrimônio común histórico 
o artístico y paisagístico, la salud pública y las relaciones de consumo en general, entre otros, requiere 
de un instrumental procesal adecuado, novedoso y apto para tutelar los específicos derechos e interesses 
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LXXVIII of the Federal Constitution, founded on the principle of human dignity. In 
this sense, the Judicial Power has a fundamental role in carrying out this mitigation, 
based on the principle of proportionality, by allowing levy of values lower than 50 
(fifty) times the minimum wage, as was established previously in the jurisprudence that 
was formed out of the 1973 Civil Code.
As explained above, in accordance with the principle of appropriateness, it is 
necessary to seek the exact correspondence between means and ends, so that the means 
employed will be logically compatible with the ends, so as to be perfectly suitable to 
achieve these ends. We deem the levy of part of earnings from labor to be appropriate 
to provide the ends desired, which will mean that both the fundamental rights of the 
debtor and of the creditor will be preserved.
On the other hand, in accordance with the principle of necessity, the use of 
a certain mean should be limited strictly to that which is necessary to achieve the 
desired end and, in the case of there being more than one factually possible mean, the 
mean that would cause the least damage should be chosen, in other words, the least 
restriction to other fundamental rights. In order for this principle to be implemented, 
we reason that the portion of earnings to be seized should not be greater than is 
necessary to preserve the fundamental rights of the debtor.
In relation to the principle of proportionality in the strict sense, it is necessary that 
there be a global evaluation of the situation and specifically of the correspondence between 
means and ends, in order to establish the advantages and disadvantages of the means, 
in the light of other ends involved. In the hypothesis of levy of part of earnings from the 
product of labor, there will be a disadvantage for the debtor, who will lose part of his or 
her earnings, and an advantage for the creditor, without the former sacrificing his or her 
fundamental rights. There will be a restriction of the rights of the debtor on behalf of the 
fundamental right of the creditor to temperate and effective judicial protection.
Legislation in other countries deals with the issue of impossibility to levy of 
earnings from the product of labor in a different way than the Brazilian legislation. 
Without a doubt, provisions from foreign legislations preserve the fundamental right of 
the creditor much more, which will be demonstrated in the next topic.
‘difusos’ y ‘colectivos’ o ‘ fragmentarios’ y superar las congénitas dificultades procedimentales que 
plantean tales acciones. Las mismas exigências presionan a los jueces ante el generalizado clamor por 
la excessiva duración de los conflitos, lo que ha derivado en el reconocimiento de específicas garantias 
sustentadas en los preceptos constitucionales y los tratados internacionales, tendiente a asegurar el 
dictado de las decisiones en tempo razonable, como presupuesto substantivo de la efectiva prestación 
de justicia y de las garantias de la defensa. A partir de esa premissa se expande la idea de las tutelas 
diferenciadas, los procesos urgentes, monitórios, y las cautelas anticipatorias. Esas nuevas técnicas de 
tutela – como hemos visto – desafian todos los dias la imaginación de los operadores jurídicos, quienes se 
vem impulsados a la búsqueda de las soluciones reales y concretas de ciertas situaciones para las cuales 
el proceso de cognición común se revela estructural y funcionalmente inadecuado, incrementándose en 
definitiva el protagonismo del juez”.
85
Revista Brasileira de Direito, Passo Fundo, vol. 14, n. 2, p. 64-94, Maio-Agosto, 2018 - ISSN 2238-0604
3.2 Levy of a portion of earnings from the product of labor in foreign law
The provision of levy of part of earnings from the product of labor is not a new 
concept in foreign law. For example, article 738, lines 1 and 5 of the Portuguese Civil 
Procedure Code of 201364 allow levy of part of earnings:
Art. 738. [...]
1. Two thirds of the net wages, salaries, retirement pension or any 
other social privilege, insurance payout, accident indemnization, 
life income or any other type of payment that ensures the 
subsistence of the respondent.
[...]
5. In the levy of money or bank account balance, the global value 
corresponding to the national minimum salary is unleviable or, 
in the case of alimony obligation, the quantity equivalent to the 
entirety of the pension of the non-contributory regime.
In Belgium, provisions on impossibility to levy are found in article 1.409 of its 
Code fiduciaire, which establishes minimum and maximum limits for levy, respectively 
€ 827.96 and € 1,070.90, in addition to two intermediate values: € 827.96 and € 979.18. In 
this sense, if the salary of the respondent is less than € 827.96, none of it can be levied, 
whereas is the salary is over € 1.070,90, any amount that exceeds this value by 100% can 
be levied.
The first intermediate values applies to situations in which the salary is between 
the minimum (€ 827.96) and the value of € 887.46, in which case the legislation allows 
the levy of 20% of the total. The second intermediate value applies to salaries between 
€ 887.46 and 979.18, in which case 30% of the total may be levied. Finally, when the 
salary of the respondent is between € 979.18 and the maximum (€ 1,070.90), 40% of the 
total value may be levied.
In Spain, similar to Portugal and Belgium, levy of earnings is allowed under 
certain conditions. Article 607 of the Spanish Civil Code establishes absolute 
impossibility to levy when earnings are lower than the minimum wage. Salaries above 
the minimum wage are subject to levy based on the following scale: earnings that 
exceed 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 times the minimum wage are subject to levy of 30%, 50%, 60%, 
75% and 90%, respectively.
Countries that adopt a common law system also allow levy of a portion of 
earnings. In the United States, the judge is given judicial discretion in the arbitration 
of percentage of earnings that can be levied, considering the minimum necessities of 
the respondent and their family in the concrete case. Nevertheless, there is a federal law 
64  On this subject: FREITAS, José Lebre de. A ação executiva – À luz do Código de Processo Civil de 
2013. Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, p. 249.
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that limits this discount, requiring that the debtor maintain 75% or 30 times the value 
of the minimum wage, whichever is greater65.
In foreign law, the limit to impossibility to levy is much lower than the amount of 
50 (fifty) times the minimum wage established in the Brazilian legislation. Certainly, 
the cost of life in the countries mentioned here is much higher than that in Brazil. 
In that sense, the dignity of the debtor will be preserved even with a limit to levy of 
earnings lower than 50 times the minimum salary. Indeed, the Brazilian legislation can 
be said to be excessive in the provision of impossibility to levy of earnings that are less 
than 50 times the minimum wage and this excess clearly impairs the preservation of 
the dignity of the creditor.
3.3 Relativization of impossibility to levy of high-value family assets – 
established in law 8.009/90 – based on the principle of proportionality
Protection of family assets in the Brazilian legislation derives historically from 
the 1939 Texas Homestead Law. It arose after a phase of unbridled development that led 
to widespread speculation. The illusion of an easy profit led to exploitation involving 
very high-value loans, which resulted in the financial crisis between the years of 1937 
and 1939. The Homestead Law was created during this period of acute economic crisis 
in order to protect the homes of debtors66.
Clearly, the concern on the part of the legislation to preserve the fundamental 
right of the debtor to housing in Law 8.009/90 is commendable67. However, the law 
makes no distinction between properties of high and low value, between a mansion 
and a shack. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice68 is passive in terms of 
65 FRIEDENTHAL, Jack H.; KANE, Mary Kay; MILLER, Arthur R. Civil Procedure, St. Paul, West 
Publishing, 1985, p. 713, addressing this subject, claims: “Regardless of which form of income execution 
is used, the judgment debtor should be given an opportunity to demonstrate his reasonable needs and 
those of his family. The exact amount to be deducted from the judgment debtor’s wage is discretionary 
with the court. Indeed, it has been held that even the judgment debtor’s stipulation to pay a specified 
amount is not controlling, especially it the debtor’s circumstances change after the stipulation. However, 
some state legislatures have limited the court’s discretion by declaring that no more than a certain 
percentage or fixed dollar amount may be deducted from a wage earner’s income, and Congress has 
enacted a statute providing that no court – state or federal – may authorize a deduction from a judgment 
debtor’s wages that will leave his remaining income less than 75% of his take home pay or 30 times the 
minimum hourly wage, whichever is greater”.
66  In this sense: AZEVEDO, Álvaro Villaça. Bem de família, p. 24-28.
67  There is also an instituted family asset, established in articles 1.711 and 1722 of the Brazilian Civil Code.
68  REsp 1178469/SP, Rel. Ministro MASSAMI UYEDA, TERCEIRA TURMA, julgado em 18/11/2010, 
DJe 10/12/2010. In the same sense, another decision of the Supreme Court of Justice: “CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. LACK OF PRE-QUESTIONING. PRECEDENT 211/STJ. FAMILY ASSET. LAW N 
8.009/09. HIGH-VALUE PROPERTY. RESTRICTIONS TO THE GUARANTEE OF UNLEVIABILITY. 
INEXISTENT. 1. The thesis developed based on art. 274 of the Civil Code was not the object of analysis 
of the ordinary court, which can be configured as lack of prequestioning and blocks the access to the 
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the literal interpretation of Law 8.009/90 and does not make any distinction in terms of 
value of the property in the determination of impossibility to levy of family assets69
HIGH-VALUE PROPERTY – IRRELEVANCE, FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY TO LEVY - INDEX OF 
MONETARY CORRECTION – JURISPRUDENTIAL 
DIVERGENCE – DEMONSTRATION – INEXISTENCE –
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION- FINE - IMPOSSIBILITY – 
PROCRASTINATORY INTENTION – ABSENCE - PRECEDENT 
98/STJ – APPEAL PARTIALLY HEARD AND, TO THIS EXTENT, 
PARTIALLY GRANTED.
I – The jurisprudence of this Court has already indicated that it is 
possible to constitute panels or chambers for rulings by a majority 
of summoned judges, as long as the summons is carried out within 
legal parameters and following provisions established by the Federal 
Constitution.
II – The issues related to the existence of a hidden defect, as well 
as to pursuing execution in the manner that is least onerous to the 
debtor, were not the object of debate or deliberation in the appellate 
decision, despite the opposition of a motion for clarification, which 
resulted in the Precedent 211/STJ.
III – It is possible to levy a portion of the property, characterized as 
a family asset, when it is possible to dismember it without it altering 
its characterization as such. Precedents.
IV – The assessment of the nature of the family asset, sustained by 
Law n 8.009/90, being an issue of public order and not subject to 
subject matter from this Supreme Court of Law. Precedent 211/STJ. 2. A appellant seeks to suspend 
the protective regime of Law n 8.009/90 with the justification that the only property belonging to the 
respondent, and which serves as the family residence, is a very high-value property, a house situated in 
the Leblon neighborhood, city of Rio de Janeiro/RJ. 3. Law n. 8.009/90 does not establish any restriction 
to the guarantee of property as a family asset in terms of its value, nor does it establish judicial regimes 
besides that of unleviability, not being admissible a judgment that makes such a distinction, where 
the law does not. 4. Regardless of the high-value attributed to the property by the tax authority, this 
variable does not undermine the preponderant argument, which justifies the unleviability granted by the 
legislator: indubitably, the asset is the family residence. That is sufficient to ensure the application of the 
regime established in Law n. 8.009/90. 5. Special appeal heard in part and not granted”. (REsp 1320370/
RJ, Rel. Minister CASTRO MEIRA, SEGUNDA TURMA, julgado em 06/05/2012, DJe 06/14/2012).
69  In the same sense, the jurisprudence of the Rio Grande Do Sul State Court: “INTERLOCUTORY 
APPEAL. PRIVATE LAW NOT SPECIFIED. REQUEST FOR LEVY OF FAMILY ASSET DUE TO ITS 
HIGH VALUE. NOT APPLICABLE. The family asset cannot be levied even if it is a high-value property 
and could be sold to obtain a lower value property, in order to satisfy the obligation of execution. This 
possibility is not contemplated by law, having been vetoed in the Project that resulted in law 11.382/2006, 
dealing with unleviability of family assets in the Civil Procedure Code. APPEAL NOT GRANTED.” 
(Agravo de Instrumento Nº 70035651116, Décima Sétima Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, 
Relator: Liege Puricelli Pires, Julgado em 27/05/2010).
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preclusion, comprises a dynamic court. And this circumstance is 
shaped by basic principles of human rights, including that of human 
dignity, one of the fundamental rights of our Democratic Rule of 
Law, in terms of article 1, line III, of the Federal Constitution.
V – For the family asset to be recognized as unleviable, in 
accordance with article 1 of Law n 8.009/90, it suffices that the 
property serve as the debtor’s family residence, regardless of the 
value of the asset.
VI - Article 3 of Law n 8.009/90, which establishes exceptions to the 
rule of impossibility to levy, does not raise any indication related to 
the value of the property. Therefore, it is irrelevant, for the effects 
of levy, that the property be considered luxurious or of a high 
standard. Precedent of the Fourth Panel.
VII – With regard to the monetary correction, it must be 
recognized that, special appeals by ‘sub-item c’ are not allowed 
without the demonstration of the circumstances that identify the 
confronted cases.
VIII – The motions for clarification were opposed with the 
intention of prequestioning, prohibiting, by logic, the imposition of 
a procrastinatory penalty, in the terms provided in the Precedent 
98/STJ.
IX – Special appeal partially heard and, to this extent, partially 
granted.
Clearly, the position of the Supreme Court is to preserve the dignity of the 
debtor, ensuring his or her fundamental right to housing, which is one of the guiding 
principles of the Democratic Rule of Law70.
70  In other situations (e.g., even when the property belonged to a commercial entity), The Supreme 
Court of Justice also has protected the fundamental right of the debtor to housing: “UNLEVIABILITY 
RECOGNIZED. ART 1 OF LAW 8.009/90. PRECEDENTS. APPEAL NOT GRANTED. 1. The 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has repeatedly and unequivocally indicated that the benefit granted 
by Law 8.009/90 is a mandatory rule, which contains a principle of public order, and its application 
is only suspended if one of the hypotheses described in art. 3 of Law 8.009/90 is characterized. 2. The 
jurisprudence of this eminent Court instructs to consider “the residence of the couple to be unleviable, 
even though it is the property of a commercial entity “(REsp 356.077/MG, Rel. Ministra NANCY 
ANDRIGHI, TERCEIRA TURMA, julgado em 30/08/2002, DJ de 14/10/2002, p. 226). Precedents. 3. 
Motion for clarification received as an interlocutory appeal, which is denied”. “(EDcl no AREsp 511.486/
SC, Rel. Ministro RAUL ARAÚJO, QUARTA TURMA, julgado em 03/03/2016, DJe 10/03/2016). 
The Supreme Court of Justice extends, as well, the protection of the fundamental right to housing 
to the heirs in the case of death of the debtor: “SPECIAL APPEAL. CIVIL LAW. FAMILY AND 
SUCCESSIONS. FISCAL EXECUTION. LEVY. RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY. INHERITANCE. ONLY 
ASSET. UNLEVIABILITY. FAMILY ASSET. LAW N. 8.009/1990. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
HOUSING. HUMAN DIGNITY. ARTICLES 1, III, AND 6 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
1. The protection provided by Law n. 8.009/1990 impedes the levy of rights to inheritance of the only 
family asset that makes up the inheritance succession. 2. The constitutional guarantee to housing 
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This ruling of the Supreme Court is evidently incoherent in relation to the 
protection of the fundamental right to housing. If, on the one hand, the fundamental 
right to housing is explicitly preserved in this situation, when the court71 is asked to 
provide a judgment regarding the levy of a residential property of the lease guarantor 
– applying the same guidelines as the Federal Supreme Court72– it ruled affirmatively, 
failing to protect this fundamental right.
If the Supreme Court flexibilized the fundamental right to housing in the 
hypothesis contemplated in article 3, line VII of Law 8.009/90, why not do the same 
for the impossibility to levy of high-value family assets? It is not an overstatement to 
claim that in terms of the possibility of alienation of a high-value family asset, the 
situation is much less onerous than the literal application of article 3, line VII of Law 
8.009/90, since, in the latter case, there is an evident sacrifice of the right to housing 
of the guarantor (debtor), with which we disagree. In the hypothesis considered in 
this analysis, if the family asset is alienated, but a portion of the value is maintained 
by the debtor to acquire property of a lower value, then there is no sacrifice to the 
fundamental right to housing.
We believe the incoherence of the Supreme Court decisions to be fully 
inappropriate and an evident source of injustice73. The Civil Code of 2015 does not 
fulfills the principles of human dignity (arts. 1, III, and 6 of the Federal Constitution). 3. The death of 
the debtor does not automatically terminate the unleviability of the property characterized as the only 
asset of the family, nor does it make the property apt to be levied to guarantee future payments to the 
creditors. 4. Special appeal granted”. (REsp 1271277/MG, Rel. Ministro RICARDO VILLAS BÔAS 
CUEVA, TERCEIRA TURMA, julgado em 15/03/2016, DJe 28/03/2016).
71  “Civil Procedure. Execution. Service by publication. Validity. Finality of the act. 2. Execution. Levy. 
Family Asset. Guarantor. Obligation resulting from suretyship. Law 8.245/1991. 1. The procedural act 
cannot be canceled by another form when it fulfills its finality and does not cause loss to any party. 2. 
Levy of the only asset of the guarantor of the rental contract is valid as it was performed during the 
validity of Law 8.245/91, which introduced, in article 82, a new case of exclusion from impossibility 
to levy family assets, even more so when the suretyship was rendered before Law 8.009/1990”. (REsp 
145003, Rel. Ministro Edson Vidigal, Quinta Turma, 07.10.97).
72  “Guarantor. Rental Lease. Eviction. Judgment for Plaintiff. Enforcement. Responsibility for debts of the 
principal debtor. Seizure of residential property. Family asset. Admissibility. Inexistence of violation to 
the right to housing, established in art. 6 of the Federal Constitution. Constitutionality of art. 3, line VII, 
Law n 8.009/90, with language from Law n 8.245/91. Extraordinary appeal denied. Dissenting opinions. 
The leviability of the family asset of the rental guarantor, object of art. 3, line VII, of Law n. 8.009, of 
March 23, 1990, with language from Law n 8.245, of October 15, 1991, does not violate art. 6 of the 
Constitution”. (RE 407688. Tribunal Pleno, Rel. Min. Cézar Peluso. Julgamento em 08/02/2006).
73  Some scholars even considered the referred legal document to be unconstitutional due to the identical 
treatment in different situations, which was never recognized by the Judicial Power. In this sense, 
Carlos CALLAGE (In: Inconstitucionalidade da Lei 8.009 de 29 de março de 1990, RT 662/59) refere: 
“the fourth aspect is related to the complete absence of a distinguishing criterion for the value of the 
property. Contrary to what seems to be, the law does not only protect the economically weak. As long as 
the property is a family residence, it is immune to seizure, regardless of its value, location or size”.
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contemplate impossibility to levy of family assets, which continues to be regulated by 
Law 8.009/90. In this sense, article 1 of Law 8.009/90 provides unjustifiable privileges to 
certain debtors. We are certainly not protesting the protection of the fundamental right 
to housing, but against the excesses that result from of a broad interpretation. In this 
sense, we agree with ÁVILA74, that “the work of the interpretation, be it as judge or legal 
scholar, is not merely to describe the previously existing meaning of provisions. Rather, 
it is to construct these meanings. Therefore, it is also not plausible to accept the idea that 
the application of Law involves a subsumption between concepts available before the 
process of application”75.
Obviously, decent housing denotes fulfillment of the minimal functions of a 
residence, and not the maintenance of the lifestyle the debtor had before becoming 
indebted. Therefore, we believe that high-value residential properties should be 
alienated and a certain quantity should be maintained by the debtor in order to acquire 
a property of lower value, which would preserve the fundamental right to housing. 
Even if the standard of living undergoes a significant reduction, the substitution of a 
high-value property for a lower-value property ensures the preservation of the dignity 
of the debtor and their family. In contrast, the dignity of the creditor is preserved. In 
this case, the three elements of proportionality will be fulfilled. It is appropriate to 
alienate a high-value family asset inasmuch as the dignity of the creditor is preserved. 
On the other hand, this measure is necessary whenever the debtor does not possess 
other leviable assets. Otherwise, the fundamental rights of the creditor will be 
sacrificed. Finally, the principle of proportionality in the strict sense will be fulfilled, in 
that the fundamental rights of both creditor and debtor are preserved.
Preservation of family housing cannot denote the preservation of injustice and 
the disparity between the value protected by restrictions on levy and the right of the 
creditor to judicial protection. In this sense, we view the flexibilization of impossibility 
to levy of family assets as possible. Indeed, the theory of fundamental rights allows, in 
cases of conflict, the flexibilization of hypotheses of impossibility to levy established by 
law. Impossibility to levy results in a restriction to the fundamental right of the creditor 
to temperate and effective judicial protection. Clearly, restrictions to fundamental 
rights are illegitimate. However, nothing impedes a judicial review of such restrictions. 
Addressing this issue, Marcelo Lima GUERRA76 explains:
74  In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos, p. 52.
75  Humberto ÁVILA affirms (In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição à aplicação dos princípios 
jurídicos, p. 54) that “it is necessary to move beyond the belief that interpretation is merely 
reconstructing meanings, be it the legal scholar, by constructing syntactic and semantic connections, or 
judge, that adds up these connections to the circumstances of the case to rule; it is important to leave 
behind the opinion that the Judicial Power only performs the task of negative legislator, to understand 
that he or she makes the judicial order in light of the concrete case”.
76  In: Direitos fundamentais e a proteção do credor na execução civil, p. 165.
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As we have seen, restriction to fundamental rights are not, in 
principle, illegitimate. They should be, however, based on the 
fulfillment of other fundamental rights and, for that reason, subject 
to a judicial revision to verify, in the concrete case, whether the 
limitation, even though motivated by another fundamental right, 
brings about an excessive constraint to the restricted fundamental 
right. As has been said repeatedly, the restriction to a fundamental 
right is legitimate if: (a) performed to the exact measure of that 
which is essential for fulfilling the other fundamental right and if 
(b), in the concrete case, it is established that the other fundamental 
right has a greater weight than the right being restricted.
If on the one hand, impossibility to levy of a high-value family asset protects 
the fundamental right of the debtor to housing, it, without a doubt, restricts the 
fundamental rights of the creditor. Therefore, we believe that a balancing between the 
two rights is important, considering that the fundamental right to housing should give 
way to other rights that are just as relevant, and in the specific case, to the fundamental 
right of the creditor to temperate and effective judicial protection, allowing the levy 
of high-value residential properties77. The issue of greater or lesser restriction to levy 
of the debtor’s assets lies within the scope of conflicting fundamental rights. For this 
reason, any abstract solution with an absolute validity imposed on this conflict between 
constitutional rights is incompatible with the supremacy of the Constitution78. This is 
because such a solution to conflicting fundamental rights is radically against the nature 
of the fundamental right norms as mandate of optimization and will always implicate, at 
some point, nothing less than the negation of validity of one of the norms in conflict79.
77  For example, article 553.2 of the CPC the Province of Quebec expressly relativizes impossibility to levy 
family assets: “properties that serve as the main residence to the debtor are also expressly unleviable when 
the credit is lower than 10,000 Canadian dollars, except for the following cases: 1. when it entails credit 
guaranteed by privilege or legal or conventional mortgage, except for legal mortgage that guarantees credit 
from a sentence; 2. when it entails alimony credit; 3. when the property is already levied. For the purposes 
of the present paper, the sum of credit is that from the judgment by virtue of which the property could be 
levied, including the interest accrued up to the date of the sentence, but not the expenses”.
78  Addressing normative application, Humberto Ávila instructs (In: Teoria dos Princípios – da definição 
à aplicação dos princípios jurídicos, p. 68): “either one examines the argument that grounds the rule 
itself (rule’s purpose) to fulfill, restricting or extending, the meaning content of the normative hypothesis, 
or one resorts to other arguments, based on other norms to justify the non-compliance of that rule 
(overruling). These considerations are sufficient to show that it is not adequate to claim that rules 
“possess” an absolute ‘all or nothing’ mode of application. Norms that seem to indicate an unconditional 
mode of application can also be the object of overruling by arguments not conceived of by the legislator 
for normal cases. The consideration of the concrete circumstances and individuals is not related to the 
structure of the norms, but to their application; both principles and rules may involve the consideration 
of specific aspects, which were abstractly not considered.”.
79  In this sense: Marcelo Lima GUERRA. Direitos fundamentais e a proteção do credor na execução civil, p. 166.
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4 Final considerations
The conflict between fundamental rights of the debtor and creditor in civil 
procedure is a reality that must be addressed from a constitutional perspective. 
The conflict should be settled based on the principle of proportionality, taking 
into account its three elements. In the scope of civil procedure, a measure will 
be appropriate when it allows for the protection of the dignity of both debtor 
and creditor. In that sense, it may be necessary to flexibilize the hypotheses of 
impossibility to levy established in the legislation in order to preserve the dignity of 
the creditor. On the other hand, as an expression of the principle of proportionality in 
the strict sense, the limitations to levy cannot be relativized to the point of restricting 
the essential core of fundamental rights of the debtor.
In terms of monthly earnings from the product of labor, a value lower than 50 
(fifty) times the minimum wage can, in our opinion, be the object of levy, because in 
this case, the apparent disadvantage that would result to the debtor would impede the 
sacrifice of fundamental rights of the creditor. In this hypothesis, the rights of the debtor 
are restricted in order to preserve the fundamental rights of the creditor to temperate 
and effective judicial protection. Regarding this aspect, the existent provisions in foreign 
law preserve both the fundamental rights of the debtor and creditor.
In relation to high-value family assets, we also believe they should be subject 
to levy, again to preserve the rights of both debtor and creditor. The preservation of 
housing cannot denote the preservation of injustice and a disparity between the value 
protected by the restriction and the right of the creditor to temperate and effective 
judicial protection.
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